Jonathan S.
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- First Name
- Jonathan
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- Jan 19, 2023
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- '22 4CT, '22 Audi A6 Allroad, '23 BMW i4 M50

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- #1
Or rather, it all made sense back in January 2020.
More precisely, it was made sense of back in January 2020 via this article:
… combined with the benefit of almost four years of increasingly disappointing failures since then.
Note the self-congratulatory corporate culture of assessing as the “high road” and “most challenging road” the mistaken investment decision of going all-in on nonexistent 150kW and 350kW chargers to serve the needs not of actual EV drivers but instead of theoretical future drivers of theoretical future EV models that would be designed to charge at faster speeds in large part because of EA’s theoretical network of fully functioning 150kW and 350kW chargers.
Did that prior paragraph make sense? Of course not, but that’s the entire point!
EA was clearly also trying to serve the needs of EA itself – or rather its 100% owner VAG at the time (now 80% VAG and 20% Siemens) – so the charging network would be more valuable once the fourth 30-month cycle is complete in early 2027 upon which EA can be sold to another network to the benefit of VAG (and now Siemens in part).
Except that the misguided equipment decision will end up costing EA (and VAG) dearly since many (most? all?) of those pricey 150kW and 350kW chargers that at the time of the January 2020 article were either already installed or planning to be installed will be scrapped by 2027. So much for, “Having a network of 150 kW to 350 kW chargers guarantees that they won't be obsolete any time soon.”
(Although EA now says in its most recent investment plan that it knew this all along: “Early generation hardware installed for much of Cycles 1 and 2 was purchased with the expectation that the end of useful life would be reached by Cycle 4. With the opening of the first stations 2018, the first tranche of hardware is now approaching the end of its useful life in 2023.”)
The article also sets up a potentially false dichotomy between a network of 50kW chargers vs the network EA chose to build of 150kW and 350kW chargers – might chargers of, say, 100kW been more readily available, or ultimately more reliable? (I have no idea, but I do know that they exist now.) Or build out stations that comprised, say, three 50kW chargers with a fourth charger of either 150kW or 350kW and see which models worked well.
A scan of the reader comments at the time turned up an interesting tidbit: I had noticed previously that creditable costs for overhead were capped at 10% in the consent decree but didn’t think much of it at the time. However, that includes EA salaries. I suspect that EA has a reasonably well-compensated and staffed cadre of upper-level management, all of it a creditable cost. Then EA can spend all it wants/proposes/submits on contractors for maintenance, repairs, call centers, software, etc.
My thesis (admittedly with no evidence) is that EA has no remaining margin for creditable costs to be used for middle management. Sure, all those procurement officers might be boring positions with boring people, but they are the people who select the contractors and ensure they’re actually getting the job done – or dismiss them and hire competitors if otherwise. (Note that EA could of course just pay those salaries anyway if they’re not creditable costs, but then VAG’s commitment would exceed $2b.)
Meanwhile, I will try applying the EA corporate culture to my own life:
More precisely, it was made sense of back in January 2020 via this article:
… combined with the benefit of almost four years of increasingly disappointing failures since then.
Note the self-congratulatory corporate culture of assessing as the “high road” and “most challenging road” the mistaken investment decision of going all-in on nonexistent 150kW and 350kW chargers to serve the needs not of actual EV drivers but instead of theoretical future drivers of theoretical future EV models that would be designed to charge at faster speeds in large part because of EA’s theoretical network of fully functioning 150kW and 350kW chargers.
Did that prior paragraph make sense? Of course not, but that’s the entire point!
EA was clearly also trying to serve the needs of EA itself – or rather its 100% owner VAG at the time (now 80% VAG and 20% Siemens) – so the charging network would be more valuable once the fourth 30-month cycle is complete in early 2027 upon which EA can be sold to another network to the benefit of VAG (and now Siemens in part).
Except that the misguided equipment decision will end up costing EA (and VAG) dearly since many (most? all?) of those pricey 150kW and 350kW chargers that at the time of the January 2020 article were either already installed or planning to be installed will be scrapped by 2027. So much for, “Having a network of 150 kW to 350 kW chargers guarantees that they won't be obsolete any time soon.”
(Although EA now says in its most recent investment plan that it knew this all along: “Early generation hardware installed for much of Cycles 1 and 2 was purchased with the expectation that the end of useful life would be reached by Cycle 4. With the opening of the first stations 2018, the first tranche of hardware is now approaching the end of its useful life in 2023.”)
The article also sets up a potentially false dichotomy between a network of 50kW chargers vs the network EA chose to build of 150kW and 350kW chargers – might chargers of, say, 100kW been more readily available, or ultimately more reliable? (I have no idea, but I do know that they exist now.) Or build out stations that comprised, say, three 50kW chargers with a fourth charger of either 150kW or 350kW and see which models worked well.
A scan of the reader comments at the time turned up an interesting tidbit: I had noticed previously that creditable costs for overhead were capped at 10% in the consent decree but didn’t think much of it at the time. However, that includes EA salaries. I suspect that EA has a reasonably well-compensated and staffed cadre of upper-level management, all of it a creditable cost. Then EA can spend all it wants/proposes/submits on contractors for maintenance, repairs, call centers, software, etc.
My thesis (admittedly with no evidence) is that EA has no remaining margin for creditable costs to be used for middle management. Sure, all those procurement officers might be boring positions with boring people, but they are the people who select the contractors and ensure they’re actually getting the job done – or dismiss them and hire competitors if otherwise. (Note that EA could of course just pay those salaries anyway if they’re not creditable costs, but then VAG’s commitment would exceed $2b.)
Meanwhile, I will try applying the EA corporate culture to my own life:
“Here are the eggs you wanted!”
“You were supposed to buy organic eggs at Whole Foods.”
“Right!”
“These are pasture-raised eggs from Big Y.”
“Right!”
“You bought the wrong eggs!”
“No, I took the high road, the most challenging road.”
“Why didn’t you buy the right eggs that I wanted?”
“That would have the easy route!”
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